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SERBIAN SOCIETY UNDERGOING LONG-LASTING 
SOCIO-ECONOMIC CRISIS: A CRITICAL REVIEW  
OF EXPLANATIONS
SILVANO BOLCIC1
ABSTRACT Serbian society is presently facing a deep and long-lasting socio-economic 
crisis. The Serbian government, in order to prevent the country’s economic collapse, has 
introduced “new reforms” aimed at increasing financial consolidation and enhancing new, 
primarily foreign, investment. The first measures of the reform package involved reducing 
the salaries paid to individuals employed in the public sector and reducing the pensions of 
individuals who receive pensions from public pension funds. This paper is devoted to an 
analysis of the overt and hidden justification for such measures. The present Serbian political 
leaders seem to consider “the building of socialism”, worker self-management, and socialist 
egalitarianism to be the key causes of the long-lasting socio-economic crisis in Serbia. 
“Working people” who had allegedly supported the previous socialist order appear to be 
considered the beneficiaries of that inefficient social order. Therefore, recent measures for 
reducing governmental spending should fall on “the shoulders of working people”. The paper 
presents an assessment and findings which should show, in a different light, the functioning 
of the former socialist order in Yugoslavia and Serbia. It accentuates the specific societal 
orientation and public policies that contributed to the excessive spending of the former 
socialists, and even of the new “post- socialist” Serbian state. Leading political forces, former 
and current, played a crucial role in designing and implementing economically destructive 
public policies, not ordinary citizens (“working people“), in spite of the former’s worker 
self-management and the current “rule of democracy”. The author suggests employing an 
alternative strategy to confront the long-lasting socio-economic crisis in Serbia; a strategy 
of increasing and efficiently using all disposable economic and social resources. A new and 
thorough redesign of ownership relations in society is the key component of this strategy.
KEYWORDS  socio-economic crisis, weakness of socialism, self-management, 
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INTRODUCTION
The focus of this paper is on recent (2014-2016) developments in modern Serbia, 
and, in particular, on the mainstream explanations2 for the long-lasting causes of 
the socio-economic crisis in Serbia. These prevailing explanations of the main 
causes of the formerly unfavorable economic and overall social developments in 
Serbia (especially developments since 1990) have led to the specific articulation 
of an actual strategy of societal transformation, to the determination of specific 
public policies aimed at the elimination of the crisis, and to the concretization 
of actors responsible for previously unfavorable developments; actors on whose 
shoulders should be placed most of the burden of the recent policies aimed at the 
elimination of the crisis. 
Governments that wish to be really efficient at eliminating crises in their 
countries should be open to public dialogue, especially about the basic causes 
of previously unfavorable social developments. This paper addresses some issues 
related to this topic such as the causes of the long-lasting social crisis in Serbia, 
and the public policies which are needed to initiate changes which will lead to 
more successful social development in Serbia in the future. 
Of course, it is most difficult to make unquestionable, scientifically based 
claims about specific causes of social development3. However, by revoking some 
well-established findings4 about real developments in Serbia during the “years of 
socialism” (1945-1990), the author attempts to minimize the danger of presenting 
an ideologically biased critique of current anti-crisis public policy in Serbia. 
These findings, of course, will be presented in a condensed form by mentioning 
just some of the relevant studies, assuming that readers of this paper are not in 
need of thorough documentation for every statement which relates to long-term 
2  In focus are the mainstream explanations expressed in dominant political narratives and in schol-
arly and other works by influential economists, political scientists and other intellectuals. One 
of the most politically influential works about reforms in post-socialist Serbia (post-1990) was 
presented by Group 17 (1997).  One should also consider important the scholarly elaboration of 
the main causes of the unfavorable socio-economic performance of “socialist Yugoslavia” by Lj. 
Madzar (1990).    
3  Social scientists are aware of the complex nature of causation which must be addressed when 
dealing with social phenomena. One could evoke the name of a classic writer on this topic 
(R.M. MacIver, 1942), and, of course, many others. This author consulted on this topic V. Milic 
(1978:642-657).
4  These findings are, in most cases, based on statistical data about the performance of the economy 
and some other features of everyday life in former Yugoslavia described and commented on in 
books such as that of B. Horvat (1984), S. Bolcic (1974), S. Bolcic (2013), and some other sources 
which will be mentioned in this paper.
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developments in Serbia5. This paper is only intended to be a review paper, not a 
thorough study (book) about all aspects of the Serbian socio-economic crisis that 
has lasted for many decades.
This author assumes that current mainstream explanations for the main causes 
of the long-lasting Serbian socio-economic crisis, at least in part, originate from 
ideological standpoints which are held by current political leaders in Serbia and 
their supporters about the generally negative socio-economic impact of socialist 
orders in general, and also of the peculiar self-management socialist order that 
existed in former Yugoslavia and Serbia in the period 1945-1990. These ideological 
standpoints6 are usually not made explicit in explanations for the current anti-crisis 
public policies. Current political leaders in Serbia assume that, due to the collapse 
of the socialist order in most of the former socialist countries following the end 
of 1989, including the Soviet Union and former “socialist Yugoslavia”, the claim 
they make about the generally negative socio-economic impact of socialist orders 
is unquestionably “historically” proven.  This assumption justifies their tacit, 
unspoken ideological standpoint about the long-term causes of the current Serbian 
socio-economic crisis that they promise to overcome. However, this ideological 
standpoint becomes clear when the measures involved in the “new reform” are 
elaborated and when the social actors, on whose shoulders will be placed the main 
burden of these new anti-crisis reforms, are determined. 
Before entering the debate about the causes of the long-lasting and current 
socio-economic crisis in Serbia, it is useful to present some clarifications about 
the characteristics of the Serbian crisis which current “new reformers” promise 
to overcome using the new “radical reform measures”7. Even when current 
Serbian political leaders define the current socio-economic crisis in terms of the 
present malfunctioning of the economy (recessions, or the negative GDP growth 
rate of the past several years; enormous foreign debt – over 24 billion USD; 
increases in the state budget deficit; a high level of unemployment – over 20% 
of the labor force in 2014), which has been an issue since the pre-1990 period, it 
is also claimed that these negative trends have been significantly caused by the 
inappropriate state policies of previous times, enacted by former “post-2000” 
Serbian governments. 
5  A relatively short but relevant analysis of the long-lasting development and systemic weaknesses 
of the Yugoslav self-management system prior to the years of transition (year 2000) is given in Y. 
Koyama (2003). 
6  Ideological standpoints are usually presented as generalized value-biased statements; as “axioms” 
which should not and cannot be questioned; used by advocates of certain particular interests as 
“proper” and socially “correct” interests.  
7  The author uses sometimes quotation marks to indicate that mentioned phenomena are not real but 
quasi phenomena.
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Some analysts8 of post-1945 developments in Serbia are inclined to say that, 
except for some successful years, former Yugoslavia (Serbia being part of that 
state), has been in permanent crisis. These analysts consider this crisis to be an 
unavoidable consequence of the “building of socialism” that began after 1945 
when the Yugoslav Communist Party took power in Yugoslavia.   
However, in a stricter sense, social scientists started to speak about the “crisis 
situation” in former Yugoslavia at the beginning of the 1980s9, when – in spite 
of some socio-economic reforms enacted during the 1970s – inflation rapidly 
accelerated, along with unemployment and foreign debt, due to the negative 
balance in international trade, as well as a steady decrease in the GDP growth 
rate and the worsening of the living conditions of the great majority of citizens 
in the former Yugoslavia10. 
These negative economic trends continued during the 1980s, provoking a 
deepening of the social crisis characterized by serious social cleavages, social 
disintegration, and inter-ethnic conflicts which could not be mediated by existing 
institutions. The existing political system manifested its inability to resolve 
conflicting economic and other interests within the Yugoslav Federation11. Largely 
independent political elites in republics (following the beginning of 1980) started 
to build their “legitimacy” and power by making promises to citizens in their 
republics to safeguard primarily, and, if necessary, “by all means”12, the “state 
and national” interests of citizens in given republic13, even if this should imply 
leaving the existing Yugoslav federal state. Ethno-national sentiments have been 
8 See Lj. Madzar (1990), D. Popovic (2014).
9  This author coordinated a group of sociologists, appointed by the Presidency of SFR Yugoslavia 
in 1982, as an expert group in charge of elaborating the social aspects of the long-term program of 
economic stabilization. This group characterized the social situation in Yugoslavia as a situation of 
social crisis, while the situation was officially qualified as a situation of “economic instability”. For 
more on this, see S. Bolcic (2013: 268-272) and also J. Zupanov (1983). 
10 For more about this crisis, see B. Horvat (1985:7-10)
11  Federal institutions (the federal assembly and federal government) were unable to enact timely 
resolutions and laws that could have resolved the state’s problems, such as preventing further 
inflation, providing funds for promoting the development of less-developed areas (republic and 
provinces) of Yugoslavia, or even the election of the presiding member of the Presidency of Yugo-
slavia who acted as the “collective head” of the state of Yugoslavia. 
12  This qualification was expressed in one of the statements made by S. Milosevic during the unsuc-
cessful meeting of former leaders of Yugoslav republics in the spring of 1991. “By all means” also 
refers to the start of the “internal war” which began in spring of 1991, first in Croatia (Plitvice) 
and then in Bosnia and Herzegovina.    
13  This explanation of the essence of the conflicts in former Yugoslavia has been also suggested by 
Koch, a Dutch political scientist, as quoted by Koyama (2003:47). 
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enhanced in all spheres of everyday life14. Political ethno-nationalism started to 
mold the political orientations of all the actors from the social scene.15
 Without attempting to provide a thorough description and explanation of the 
factors which caused the dissolution of the Yugoslav federation at the beginning 
of 1990s16 (which provoked tragic internal wars, wars between various parts of 
the former Yugoslav state, wars between the still-legal, at the beginning of 1990s, 
Yugoslav Army, and legally established “territorial armies” in some republics 
(Croatia), wars between ethnic groups within republics, and wars between 
nominally legal and “para”-legal militarized units in various local communities), 
it is clear that the social crisis of the 1980s in the former Yugoslavia (and also 
Serbia) entered its most destructive form in the 1990s, with tragic human losses 
and the most damaging consequences for the future economy and everyday lives 
of people in every part of the former Yugoslavia. All further specific crises which 
occurred in the period following the beginning of 1990s in Serbia, including 
the current crisis being tackled by the new “radical reforms” of the present 
government led by Aleksandar Vucic, are consequences of the developments of 
the 1990s, including the consequences of the policies enacted by the regime of 
Slobodan Milosevic who played the crucial role in generating the tragic and the 
most destructive social crisis of the 1990s17. 
Even if this dynamics of crisis evolution since the beginning of the 1980s in 
former Yugoslavia and Serbia has been part of the personal experience of all 
who lived in this country, including the current Serbian leaders, many of the 
analysts of the current crisis in Serbia are inclined to forget the causal effect 
of the tragic crisis of 1990s on the current crisis, and to focus attention either 
on the weaknesses of former socialist order in Yugoslavia in general, or on the 
weaknesses of post-2000 governmental policies. 
The current government tends to justify their “new reforms” by pointing to 
the weaknesses of the policies put in place by all post-2000 governments led 
by the Democratic Party and its various coalition partners. However, the key 
14  Support for this claim can be found in a book by A. Mimica and R. Vucetic (2008) in which is 
presented a systematic review of “readers’ comments” about the happenings in Yugoslavia and 
Serbia which were published in the daily newspaper POLITIKA. 
15  See, D. Vujadinovic et al., eds. (2005); in particular the contribution by B. Jaksic (pp. 181-200).
16  The quantity of written materials about this topic is enormous and growing. “Explanation stories” 
are different, often providing conflicting answers. A comprehensive review of these narratives 
and “stories” about the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia is given by J. Bakic (2011). Also, 
the findings and assessments of the author of this paper are presented in a book by the author (S. 
Bolcic, 2013:57-89). 
17  An analysis of the social crisis of the 1990s is given in S. Bolcic (2013). See also S. Bolcic’s paper 
in the Corvinus Journal of Sociology and Social Policy (Vol. V, 2014/2).
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element in the strategy of recovery of Serbia by these post-2000 governments 
has been the idea of the “transition from socialism” and the restoration of the 
modern capitalist order, primarily through the clear privatization of all firms 
that were formerly under “social ownership” and were organized as “self-
management organizations”, followed by privatization of most of the firms in 
“public ownership” and also of most of the firms in “state ownership”18.
 The key rulers of these post-2000 governments in Serbia were ideological 
supporters of the pro-capitalist regulation of the economy, convinced that “neo-
liberalism” was the best theory for explaining the efficient rules for building 
a prosperous economy and society. One may wonder what the reasons are for 
the radical critique of these post-2000 governments by the current Serbian 
government who wish to start a new strategy of recovery for modern Serbia. 
According to the explanations provided by the current government19, the 
previous governments were not ready and sincerely committed to introducing 
the most “painful reforms”, such as limiting and reducing the personal incomes 
of those employed in the public sector, and the reduction of pensions of those 
whose pensions are being paid for by public pension funds. Also, those previous 
governments, it is claimed, provided a “space” for the enrichment of narrow 
groups of private businessmen (“tycoons”) who were involved in many corrupt 
activities which previous (post-2000) governments tacitly tolerated, often 
for their own personal benefit. According to the current claims, widespread 
corruption is one of principal reasons for the hesitation shown by foreign 
investors about starting businesses in Serbia. The “battle against corruption” 
was one of the first measures enacted by the government which was formed 
after the 2012 parliamentary elections when the Serbian Progressive Party got 
a majority of seats in the Serbian Assembly, and when A. Vucic became “First 
Vice-President”. 
The present Serbian leaders received support for their “radical reforms” from 
most influential Western leaders and international institutions, and received 
appreciation for the outcomes of those reforms. The policy of austerity practiced 
in Serbia, in the first place through the reduction of the personal incomes of the 
majority of those employed in the public sector, and the reduction of pensions (not 
all pensions, but some 40% of the pensions paid from public pension funds which 
amounted to more than 25000 dinars per month) seems to be in accordance with 
the prevailing orientations of governments in countries facing various forms of 
economic crisis. 
18  On the legal differentiation between firms in public and state ownership, see Zakon o javnim 
preduzecima (2016). 
19  See Vucic (2014).
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The current Serbian government promised to avoid “state bankruptcy” by 
reducing budgetary spending on personal incomes and pensions; by cutting 
all other spending related to the functioning of national and local state 
administration; by reducing unpaid contributions to the budget due to the 
extensive “grey economy” and tax evasion; and by supporting new investment, 
primarily in the private sector, which would generate new employment and 
reliably increase the state budget. In the long run (over the next several years) 
such measures should generate a steady increase in the GDP growth rate, new 
employment in profitable businesses, the gradual reduction of foreign debt, and 
a gradual increase in personal incomes and pensions which will not lead to an 
increase in the state budgetary deficit as was the case during the period of rule 
by the preceding post-2000 governments. 
This new government, formed by the Serbian Progressive Party and supported 
by over 50% of voters in 2012 regular elections, and also in the 2014 and 2016 
snap elections, seems to have garnered democratically expressed consent from 
the Serbian citizenship for its anti-crisis public policies. Except for the critical 
assessments of these anti-crisis policies by most of the parties in the opposition 
and by some social analysts, there has not been serious open social protest 
against these policies, even from those whose personal incomes and pensions 
have been reduced. 
However, A. Vucic’s government has extended the time (first from 2015 to 
2016, then to 2017-2018) that they claim the positive outcomes of these anti-crisis 
policies will become visible by, and also used all forms of political marketing 
to popularize the government’s anti-crisis activities and the “signs” of change 
in the promised direction. It is a fact that the state budget deficit has decreased, 
even exceeding expectations in 2015 and the first half of 2016; that the GDP 
growth rate has been positive (0.8% in 2015 and, most probably, 2.5% in 2016); 
that the rate of unemployment fell from 21% to 19.5% in 2015, and also that the 
level of inflation has been kept very low over the last two years (less than 2% 
annually). The facts are also that total state foreign debt continues to be very 
high (about 24 billion USD, and over 70% of the yearly GDP); that certain large 
public companies under direct government control continue to “produce” big 
business losses which must be covered by the state budget; that the total level of 
consumption continues to be reduced in comparison to the pre-2014 level, and 
that a real “big push” in new investment (by foreign and domestic investors) is 
still awaited. 
The aim of this paper is not to assess in full scope this recent Serbian anti-
crisis policy. The key issue here is to examine the “contextual explanations” for 
the causes of previous and current crises in Serbia; explanations which lie behind 
the specific articulation of the present anti-crisis public policies.                    
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ON THE EXPLANATIONS FOR THE KEY CAUSES OF 
SOCIO-ECONOMIC CRISIS IN SERBIA
During the assessment of the actual economic and the overall social situation 
there have been various qualifications, sometime even very “dramatic” ones, like 
those which claimed that “Serbia is facing economic collapse”, or that there is 
a threat of a “Greek” scenario20. This indicates that the state has become an 
overburdened debtor21 which is not able to meet its financial obligations toward 
external creditors, and also that it cannot meet its obligations towards its own 
citizens. Leading state functionaries, faced with such a serious situation, have 
proposed to their citizens “painful reforms” that will last for several years in the 
form of reduced rights and increased obligations as the only means to prevent 
this frightening movement towards overall state collapse in Serbia. It is expected 
that citizens will accept this policy of austerity, in part because they “love Serbia 
as their homeland”22, but also because citizens are aware that in the previous 
decades they lived better than they should have, especially considering how they 
worked. Citizens may also be considered culpable for their tolerance of, or tacit 
consent with, the “socialist social order” and public policies which generated 
economic decay in Serbia.
Are these sacrifices imposed on citizens in present Serbia just, and should 
“ordinary people” unquestionably accept the main burdens of this new battle to 
“build” a prosperous, modern and normal Serbia? 
Of course, throughout history, all state misfortunes and all state expenses 
have fallen onto the shoulders of citizens; primarily onto the shoulders of 
those “ordinary” citizens which are the most numerous in every society, and 
who comprise the segment of society with very limited social power, unable 
to counteract the often unjust demands of those in power. Still, if “ordinary” 
current citizens of Serbia cannot avoid the fate of shouldering the main burden 
of the new austerity policies (aimed at “healing” the “sick” Serbian economy), 
they must not, at least not consentingly and willingly, accept the role of being the 
main culprits for the “sickening” of the former Serbian economy.
 If one reconsiders, using appropriate arguments, the mainstream explanations 
for the causes of this “sickening” of the present Serbian economy, one cannot easily 
20  Such assessments were often given over the past several years by the Serbian Prime minister A. 
Vucic in his public statements, and also in his expose to the Serbian Assembly (2014). 
21  The budget deficit in Serbia in 2014 was over 6%. The law stipulated that a maximum state debt 
toward external creditors of 45% of annual GDP was tolerable, but in 2014 debt was over 70% of 
yearly Serbian GDP. 
22  This expected “love for Serbia” is often stressed by A. Vucic (2014) in his speeches to the public.
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correlate the longer-term malfunctioning of the economy and the wrongdoings of 
masses of “ordinary “citizens and the inappropriate work of ordinary employees 
which would justify these new “painful reforms” and the worsening of the living 
conditions of ordinary citizens. It will be shown in this paper that these explanations 
for the causes of economic decay and justifications for austerity measures are 
contaminated with ideological biases, and that they favor the interests of certain 
social groups, especially those who control the key sources of societal power, 
wealth and the state’s repressive apparatus in the first place.  
The key factor in the malfunctioning of Serbian society, as stressed in recent 
explanations23, is the “building” of the socialist (some prefer to say “communist”) 
socio-economic system that has been dominant during the post-Second World 
War history of Serbia (Yugoslavia).  
Many learned and lay commentators are convinced that such a system was 
doomed to fail24, generating the behaviors of various social actors that were, in 
the long run, counter-productive in the economic and the overall social sense. 
The recent (post-1989) decay of most of the “socialist” regimes, those of Eastern 
Europe in particular, seems to justify this “historical verdict” of socialist systems 
as anti-modern and inefficient social arrangements. Therefore, if citizens in 
present Serbia are faced with unfavorable living conditions, this is, in first place 
– according the claims of their actual political leaders – a result of the open or 
tacit consent of these citizens to the “building” of socialism in Serbia since 1945.
In the realm of ideology and in the formation of the actual dominant social 
consciousness, this generally negative assessment of the previous “socialist 
order” appears to be backed up by a great number of ordinary citizens25, even 
if these citizens are not able to connect the “shortcomings of socialism” and 
the actual experience of everyday life they had during the “socialist” period in 
Serbia. They still remember many good things that ordinary citizens had in their 
everyday lives during those “years of socialism”, and they regret the loss of those 
good things in the recent “post socialist” years in Serbia26.
Sophisticated commentators about socialist systems27 have, of course, better 
insights into socialist ideas and “socialist practices” and, if they consider seriously 
all the relevant findings, will not easily discard socialist social arrangements as 
a historical “dead-end”. One could warn that there is not just one cause for the 
23 See for example, Madzar, Lj. (1990; 2000) and Labus, M. (1994).
24 Lazic, M. (1987:34-36), Labus, M. (1994).
25  According to the findings of S. Mihajlovic (2005), some two-fiths of respondents in Serbia in 1997 
negatively assesed the previous socialist system. 
26 S. Mihajlovic (2005:210-218) has presented survey results confirming these observations.
27 See, for example, B. Horvat (1984), and V. Katunaric (2013). 
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unsuccessful functioning of any given society, and the “socialist order” might be 
just one of those causes. Public policies, based on the premises of one key factor, 
designed primarily to correct systemic shortcomings, may easily be inefficient, 
generating many unforeseen social consequences. 
One should not forget the scholarly and valuable comparative studies of 
contemporary social systems28; for example, the works of Jaroslaw Vanek 
(1971) and Branko Horvat (1984) which emphasized some of the comparative 
advantages of socialist societal orders (including those of the Soviet Union 
and socialist Yugoslavia in the years 1950-1980). Quantitative indicators 
of the wellbeing of the “average citizen”, as documented in B. Horvat’s book 
Political Economy of Socialism (1984) suggest that somewhat better societal 
conditions existed in countries with “real socialism” then in the countries with 
developed capitalist systems during the same time period. “Socialist societies” 
were societies with less economic inequality, with greater access to education 
and health care and greater increases in life expectancy (Horvat, 1984: 53-55). 
Horvat (1970) also presented data about the post-1945 development of Yugoslavia, 
documenting the positive rates of growth of social products, capital, employment 
and ‘technical progress” during the years of “self-managed socialism” (1954-
1967) in comparison to the years of “state socialism” (1945-1953), and the years 
of capitalism (1911-1940).
Self-management is the next specific cause of the economic and the overall 
“social abyss” of the “Titoist” Yugoslavia and “socialist” Serbia. Some critical 
analysts29 claimed that self-management generated bad behavior by “self-
managers” However, during the years 1960-1980,  there were many positive 
assessments of the achievements of “self-managed socialism” in Yugoslavia, 
especially in comparison with the achievements of the “soviet type of socialism” 
in other “socialist countries”. After the collapse of the “socialist” regimes in most 
East-European countries, and the collapse of the “socialist” Yugoslavia, many of 
the critical analysts of “socialist systems” started to negate any positive features 
of the Yugoslav “self-managed socialism”, claiming that, in essence, the “system” 
had been just another form of nondemocratic, basically totalitarian, historically 
doomed-to-fail, “Soviet socialism”.  Therefore, the ending of “socialism” in 
Yugoslavia (and Serbia likewise) should have led to the end of self-management 
arrangements in enterprises, in local communities and at all institutional levels of 
28  See F. Cerne (1986) on the methodological problems in comparative studies of the efficiency of 
various socio-economic systems.
29  Among the initial critics of self-managed organizations, B. Ward’s (1958) work on the “Illyrian 
enterprise” has had considerable influence. See for the critical assessments of Ward’s analysis, F. 
Cerne (1986:8-11).   
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the newly established “national states” within the borders of former “republics” 
of Yugoslavia.      
Among the main reasons for the abandonment of self-management arrangements, 
stress has been laid on the inefficiency of governance and of the dysfunctional 
executive management of all forms of business activities. It was claimed that self-
management arrangements separated decision-making and accountability for such 
decisions, the consequence frequently being bad economic and other decisions30, 
the squandering of limited resources, irrational investments, the spending of 
unearned revenue, remuneration for “non-work” and excessive payment for 
unskilled jobs, the underpayment of professional work, and ignorance about the 
entrepreneurial and innovative contributions of all participants in the sphere of 
work. “Self-managers”, normatively defined as all employed persons in the given 
work organizations, according to the assessments of those would criticize “self-
management systems”, tended to suffer from excessive and irrational employment 
conditions, and benefit from increases in personal incomes unrelated to the real 
economic performance of the given businesses (unjustified by their productivity, 
by the market valorization of their real work). Short-term needs relating to 
personal consumption, allegedly, were prioritized over the long-term need to 
improve technology and the organizational capacities of enterprises31. If one 
adds to these “weaknesses” of self-managers in performing their institutionally 
imposed managerial role their inclination to promote the legality and legitimacy 
of  the decision-making of real “rulers” (directors and “communist” political 
leaders appointed by the dominant Communist party, whose decisions were often 
very voluntaristic, with damaging  consequences), the situation becomes even 
more about “just” blaming “self-managers” for the present economic and other 
difficulties of present-day Serbia, and the readiness of Serbian leaders to get rid of 
all remnants of former “socialist self-management”.
In spite of serious scientific investigation into the effects of self-managed 
economies32, the general disqualification of self-managed social arrangements, 
especially in recent assessments, have been often ideologically biased, even if 
some of these critical arguments have been based on a comparative analysis of 
30 See, Lj. Madzar (1990).
31 See, Koyama, Y. (2003:13-15)  
32  S. Pejovic, in his book The Marked-Planned Economy of Yugoslavia (1966), suggested that self-manage-
ment could be understood as an “organizational innovation” in a Schumpeterian sense which generates 
positive changes in the “production function”. S. Bolcic (2003:273-277) summarizes economic and so-
ciological findings about the efficiency of self-managed work organizations. It is relevant to stress the 
existence of great international scientific interest in the experiences and achievements of various modes 
of self-management. Contributions presented at the first conference on “Participation and Self-Manage-
ment” held in Dubrovnik in 1972 have been published in six volumes (Pusic, E., ed. 1972-1973). 
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the functioning of various social arrangements in other “non-self-managed” 
countries. Some of the comparative “findings”, especially those confirming 
the greater economic superiority of capitalist societies in comparison to the 
economic inefficiency of the Yugoslav “self-managed” economy, were based 
primarily on data that described economic developments in Yugoslavia since 
the 1980s. These years of protracted and accentuated crisis in the former 
Yugoslavia cannot be explained solely in relation to the weaknesses of self-
management system, especially not by the lower level of productivity of workers 
in self-managed enterprises33. If one had used the same approach to qualify the 
weaknesses of capitalist economies using findings about the performances of 
these economies in the 1930s during the “Great Depression”, one might easily 
have predicted the end of capitalism.
The other weak point in these deprecations of self-management in Yugoslavia 
(Serbia) which identify the inappropriate behavior of “self-managers” (defined as 
“masses of mostly unskilled employees” lacking competence and responsibility 
in decision-making) come from the attribution of greatest real social power to 
these same “masses”, in spite of sociological findings showing a radically different 
and nondemocratic distribution of power in Yugoslav work organizations and in 
society in general34. It has been known35 that key decisions in organizations were 
made by directors and the executive management teams of firms and by political 
functionaries at all levels of the state. The assessment that the political class is 
the new governing class in all forms of “real socialism”, including “self-managed 
socialism” in Yugoslavia, has been included in most of critiques of socialism 
and self-management. One may wonder about the hidden reasons for treating the 
practically powerless “masses” of ordinary employees and citizens as the main 
culprits for the unsuccessful economy and society which existed in Serbia during 
the “decades of building of socialism” in this country.
It is evident that there were pronounced discrepancies between the normative 
“blueprint” and the practical realization of self-management at all levels of 
societal organization36. Still, when judging the outcomes of the self-management 
33  N.Mileusnic (1968) claimed that worker labor productivity measured at the level of the “work-
place” in comparable firms in Serbia and Sweden was similar, but the differences in favor of Swe-
den increased when productivity was measured at higher levels of the work organization (firm or 
business group) and differences were even greater at the state level (overall societal organization).
34  A summary of such findings about power relations in Yugoslav self-managed society have been 
presented in Bolcic (2003:265-272). See also V. Rus (1989), J. Zupanov (1969) and Zupanov (1987).
35 See the findings of V. Rus  (1972) and J. Obradovic (1982)
36  J. Zupanov (1982) and J.Zupanov (1983:130-155) describe these discrepancies and elaborate 
strategies for overcoming them using various institutional modifications of the self-management 
system in Yugoslavia.
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arrangements in former Yugoslavia and Serbia, one must consider both the 
positive and negative practical effects of these arrangements. 
One would have to take into account the real distribution of revenue in the 
“self-managed” organizations37. In doing so, one would find that a considerable 
proportion of that revenue was devoted to the internal financing of investments, 
to internal funds for the so-called “collective consumption” of employees 
in the given firms (providing for the education and skills-development of 
employees and their children), and also to meeting the financing needs of so-
called “communal needs” in local communities, and similar non-personal 
expenditure38. 
It is evident that the overall net personal incomes of employees in former 
Yugoslavia were comparatively low. In the “years of privatization” after the 1990s 
workers in general did not have the savings to buy shares in their privatized firms 
and to become new private owners in Serbia. From recent sociological findings 
(Lazic, 2014:74-78) one can conclude that the recruitment of the “new capitalist 
class” in Serbia is not related to the unjustifiably “high personal incomes” of 
former “ordinary” low-ranking self-managers (workers).  
It would not be right to overlook the fact that “self-managed” citizens in local 
communities, through the contributions taken from their net personal incomes 
in the form of so-called “local voluntary contributions”, provided funds for the 
building of local roads, of cultural and sports and recreational facilities, for 
local schools and health facilities, etc. These funds were provided in addition 
to the payment of regular state taxes at all levels of society. Thanks to these 
contributions, based on the direct and voluntary payments of “self-managers”, 
former Yugoslavia (and Serbia as one of the republics of the Yugoslav federation), 
which was a very underdeveloped country before 1941, and heavily destroyed 
37  Data on revenue distribution in self-managed firms in former Yugoslavia can be found in work 
by M. Zec (1989) and M. Korosic (1989). According to A. Bajt (1988:7), in the former Yugo-
slav economy the main problem in the domain of investment was not the insufficient level of 
investment, but the insufficient efficiency of investment due to unregulated entrepreneurial roles 
both at the level of firm and at the societal level. “Workers collectives”, which were normatively 
supposed to act as “collective entrepreneurs”, in social reality could not act as entrepreneurs, 
either in terms of making crucial business decisions or in meeting obligations and managing the 
consequences of decisions made by workers’ councils, (Zupanov 1983:63-84).    
38  Systematic evidence about the amount and effect of the financial “self-contributions” of workers 
and citizens in former Yugoslavia is scarce. Still, the available evidence (Grupa autora, 1985) 
shows that the total funding provided through the voluntary decisions of workers in enterprises 
and citizens in local communities in the form of regular reductions in their net personal incomes 
for a given time period (usually several years), contributed, for example, in 1983, 26% of the 
total communal and regional budget. Through such “self-contributions” were built most of the 
big clinics, a great many schools, cultural and recreational centers, roads and other “communal 
objects” in large cities (such as Belgrade and Zagreb) and in locations all over former Yugoslavia .
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during World War II, was able to recover in a relatively short time period and 
become, at the end of 1960s, one of the better developed European countries. 
One could claim that these rational decisions of “self-managers” have corrected, 
at least in some  part, the economically and socially damaging decisions of the 
governing “political class”; decisions based on political, not on proper economic 
grounds, especially decisions about building  new factories (in public known as 
“political factories”) and other large objects. Due to this ‘political’ spending of 
great amounts (in some cases, several billion dollars) of the country’s limited 
capital, or the taking out of hefty loans from external creditors, current citizens 
of Serbia are still paying from their generally small personal incomes. 
The “Smederevo steel factory” is just one of those “political factories” in 
Serbia which, for decades (since the 1960s), has been unable to meet its financial 
obligations, largely because of enormous external loans taken out to establish 
and run this factory. Even if the inefficient performances of all the employees, 
workers and managers alike, including their inefficient work during the “years 
of self-management” have contributed to the unfavorable business performance 
of this factory, they cannot be blamed for the very unwise initial decision to 
build this factory39; nor for spending the great amount of state money transferred 
to this firm over decades; or for the continuous hesitation of political decision-
makers, including the present ones, to take radical steps to put an end to the 
“production of losses” of the Smederevo steel factory. 
The usual accusation that “self-managers” are prone to over-employment in 
their firms is often based on theoretical “econometric” findings40 which stand 
on “shaky” grounds. Considering the real distribution of social power in “self-
managed organizations”, and the real influence of the “political structures” on 
the personnel decisions at all levels of a societal organization, including business 
organizations, one must admit that most decisions about hiring employees, 
especially in administrative jobs, were de facto made by “political structures” 
inside and outside the organizations, and it is in the interest of these “structures” 
to obtain loyal support for their great power and privileged positions in society, 
including business organizations41.
39  Steel production in Smederevo depended from the very beginning on imported pig iron and coal 
and therefore was associated with enormous transportation costs. The market realization of this 
production depended heavily on exports and the effects of the international steel market greatly 
affected its profitability.
40  B. Ward (1958) presented an econometric model of the functioning of the “firm in Illyria”, having 
in mind Yugoslav self-managed organizations. A comprehensive and critical assessment of Ward’s 
findings is given in A. Bajt (1988:39-70). 
41  Lj. Madzar (1990:91) concluded that a system based on coercion, due to its inefficiency, required 
an elaborate system of administration with an increased number of jobs for administrators.  
43
CORVINUS JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY AND SOCIAL POLICY  2 (2016)
SERBIAN SOCIETY UNDERGOING LONG-LASTING SOCIO-ECONOMIC CRISIS
It seems reasonable to assume that the total cost of the defective decisions 
made by the socialist political class is immensely greater than the cost of the 
bad decisions of the “self-managers”. Of course, one might attribute all the 
defects of the previous (“pre-transition”) socio-economic order to the “self-
management side” of that system in an attempt to ideologically disqualify that 
previous system and provide the ideological justification for a “new system” 
whose dominant (owner) class will prove its overall superiority and efficiency, 
at least in considerable part, by underpaying for the work of the masses of 
“ordinary” workers.
In the defamations of socialism and self-management in former Yugoslavia 
(and Serbia) a systemic weakness has also been claimed in the strong tendency 
of that system toward equality, and economic equality in particular. Due to such 
tendencies it is suggested that there has been insufficient functional inequality 
in the remuneration of functionally different social roles and in the valuation 
of the different contributions of those engaged in professional, managerial, 
entrepreneurial and innovative jobs. The consequence of this overstressed 
egalitarianism would have been a general blocking of creativity, the de-motivation 
of many members of society relating to the use and development of their talents, 
knowledge, and virtues, creating a brake on immediate consumption that would 
have increased personal wealth and investment capability, and a reduction in the 
fulfillment of individual interests that should also have been in the best long-term 
interests of the whole of society.
One could say that in “real socialist societies” this overstressed egalitarian 
rule was more verbally “advocated” by the leading political elite than actually 
practiced in everyday life, particularly in the everyday lives of those elites42. The 
“principle of equality” in remuneration was often used to “justify” real systemic 
neglect of individual freedom and justice. This neglect of the principles of a 
libertarian society seems to be the main problem with “real socialist societies”, 
not adherence to the “principle of equality”.  However, by treating equally those 
who were, in reality, unequal (in terms of their talents, abilities, contributions, 
and even the austerity of their consumption), such societies were faced with 
another form of inequality and injustice which lead to discontent, hidden anti-
system behavior and overall systemic inefficiency. 
42  Equality of payment in a radical sense was not part of ideological credo in former Yugoslavia. The 
principle of “remuneration according to work” was advocated with the expectation that, due to 
this principle, real differences in personal incomes would not be excessive. Critical public obser-
vations about non-socialist differences in personal incomes were addressed primarily at the level 
of differences in incomes of individuals in comparable jobs in different branches. An analysis of 
the controversy about variation in personal income in former Yugoslavia is presented in E.Berkov-
ic (1986), and M. Korosic (1983). 
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Actual “post-socialist societies” put an end to the domination of the principle of 
equality which was considered a distinctive feature of a proper socialist society, 
and one of the crucial reasons for the inefficiency of that system. But general 
neglect of the principle of equality should not be considered the distinctive 
feature of contemporary modern societies whose exclusively respected value is 
individual freedom, as advocated by supporters of the “liberal constitution” of 
modern societies. Such a society, exclusively based on “liberal principles”, would 
not be perceived, at least by the majority of its citizens, as a just society. 
One can conclude from historical experience43 that societies characterized by 
profound inequality were poorly integrated societies. Such societies frequently 
faced harsh and destructive social conflict, widespread social discontent, and 
high level of criminalization44, cultural alienation, and a massive exodus of 
citizens, both in the form of emigration and also in the form of the internal 
exclusion of citizens from the most institutionally designed social roles. In the 
long run, society burdened by intensive social conflict and poor social integration 
suffers from inefficient exploitation of its economic and social potential45.  
The recent, enduring economic and overall social problems of most developed 
societies which are characterized by an increase in inequality and social 
disintegration is a warning of the limitations of overstressing the “liberal” 
constitution of society, and suggests the need to reassess the developmental role 
of the principle of equality in contemporary societies. This warning should also 
be pertinent for the creators of the “new reforms” in present-day Serbia.    
PUBLIC POLICIES AND ECONOMIC PROBLEMS  
IN PRESENT-DAY SERBIA
The new post-socialist (“transitional”) developmental strategy, and, also, the 
recent “new (“radical”, “painful”) reforms” in Serbia stem from the formerly 
described explanations of the causes of the former unsuccessful developments 
in Serbia. Since the main culprits of those wrongdoings during the “years of 
socialism”, allegedly,  were “supporters of socialism”, “self-managers”, and 
ordinary workers, during this present course of the “healing” of the Serbian 
43  Some of these experiences have been described in studies such as that by J. A.Tainter (1988) who 
writes about the collapse of complex societies. 
44  Such descriptions of the weaknesses of contemporary developed societies are given in J. Rifkin 
(1995) and M. Castels (2002). 
45  N.Luhman suggested that the key issue for contemporary societies is not greater efficiency but a 
sufficient level of social integration (cit. V. Rus, 1995:13) 
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economy and society it will be necessary and just to reduce most of the benefits 
(including the wages and salaries) of all employed persons, especially those 
employed in the public sector, to reduce the social support that is provided by 
the state to all citizens, to increase the work-related obligations of all employees 
and to expand the rights of those in the position of employer,  both of private 
owners of the means of production and those in the control of state property. 
Market forces (conceived of as a “hidden hand”, and primarily “understood” by 
those who are owners of the means of production) should play the crucial and 
decisive role in practical decisions about the scope of the reduction of former 
workers’ and citizens’ rights. A “temporary” worsening of the quality of life of 
“working people” should be viewed as an unavoidable path to a better future for 
all citizens.
Subjugation to variable “market conditions” means, for employees, the 
acceptance of flexible job agreements, and for owners, greater rights of decision-
making and relaxed obligations toward employees. Even if the advocates of the 
“new work rules” still respect other means of motivating employees to perform 
their jobs in a productive, efficient, and committed way, under the new, “non-
socialist rules of work”, the risk of being fired should become the most effective 
form of “motivating” employees to fulfill their jobs in accordance with interests 
of their employers. 
The “internalization” of this new “work ethic” (readiness to work hard for an 
income determined solely by the owner of the firm, unquestionable loyalty to 
the firm, extended working hours) as advocated by the actual power-holders in 
Serbia, and also, considered as crucial by private owners and their “professional 
counselors”, is considered a “condition sine qua non” for the avoidance of the 
envisioned collapse of the Serbian economy and, consequently, of the decay of 
Serbia as normal modern state and society. This new “social contract” should, 
by expectation, provide the motivation for owners of capital (foreign and 
domestic) to abundantly invest their capital in Serbia, to create, in the long run, 
new employment and incomes for “working people” in Serbia and to enhance the 
sound development and inclusion of Serbian society in the prosperous part of the 
modern world. 
The “building” of this new post-socialist, “pro-capitalist” socio-economic 
order in Serbia has been underway since the beginning of the 1990s. Many 
concrete measures have been introduced to safeguard the societal domination 
of the new owner class. But, according to the proclamations of the present 
government of Serbia, the measures introduced by previous governments were 
insufficient and inefficient at meeting the needs of the owners of capital (foreign 
and domestic) and encouraging them to invest more regularly and abundantly in 
businesses in Serbia. Thanks to allegedly sincere devotion towards the radical 
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reforms of the present government of Serbia, and thanks to the popular support 
for such “painful reforms” expressed by those who cast their “ballots” in the 
2014 general elections for the Serbian progressive party, present power-holders 
in Serbia recognize that the real “transition” is yet to come in Serbia over the 
next several years. It looks, according to media reports, that such “new painful 
reforms” in Serbia are being welcomed by the present power-holders in most of 
the international centers of power. 
The years to come will, ultimately, bring confirmation of the suitability of this 
new Serbian path and put an end to the long-lasting socio-economic crisis in this 
country. Still, one should not forget that the long-lasting socio-economic crisis 
and its present manifestation stems from the cumulative effects of former public 
policies designed by numerous domestic and external social actors. Overcoming 
such a deep socio-economic crisis by introducing effective “new reforms” is 
not possible in a short time period. It is thus indispensable to reassess properly 
in this paper the complex causes of the former poor state of development and 
specific political constellations that have contributed to these inappropriate 
public policies. 
The actual power-holders in Serbia suggest, in their proclamations, that those 
who must be considered the immediate culprits for the recent near-to-collapse 
situation in Serbia are “former politicians” who took power in Serbia after the 
dethronement of Milosevic and his regime in the fall of the year 2000. 
The actual power-holders in Serbia tend to overlook their own role in the 
former destructive developments in Serbia, especially those of the 1990s when 
many of the actual Serbian politicians, including A. Vucic, contributed greatly 
to the participation of Serbia and Serbs in the “Yugoslav wars”, and supported 
the politics of S. Milosevic and served in Serbian governments during the 1990s. 
It is important to stress that the actual power-holders in Serbia are not 
seriously facing up to the damaging consequences of the type of authoritarian, 
non-democratic, voluntaristic polity that was dominant during the “years of 
socialism”, but which was also present during the “years of post-socialism”, 
including the most recent ones. 
One must admit that voluntarism (unrestricted action determined by the will of 
a given political actor) is, to a certain degree, an inherent feature of politics when 
defined as an activity aimed at directing societal development. This voluntarism 
becomes greater when the power of politicians increases, and becomes less 
controllable by those who possess the rights of the sovereign (the “demos”). In 
spite of all the institutions established in modern societies to control the power 
of politicians, those who are in key governmental positions, especially those who 
perform executive functions, continue to be the most powerful social groups in 
every society. They tend to treat their great power as their personal quality, and 
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to transform the power of the state into their personal power, often used for the 
safeguarding of their personal interests and other particular interests those power-
holders consider important. If this is indeed the case, then it is unjust to blame 
“working people” and ordinary citizens who had almost no effective influence on 
the articulation and implementation of state measures for inappropriate public 
policies and the destructive outcomes of such policies. 
The disturbing economic and overall social situation in Serbia in the past and 
in the present should be attributed, at least in part, to general political decisions 
and the desire for an important position for the Serbian state and society in 
“world relations” during the “years of socialism” and also the “years of post-
socialism”. Namely, because of the political assessments of the external threats 
to “socialist Yugoslavia” during the “cold war” years, and, nowadays, threats by 
some “great powers” to “Serbian national interests” since the1990s, exceptional 
importance has been given to maintaining the strength of the state security system, 
consisting of the comparatively numerous46 and modern army, complemented by 
the organized “units of armed citizens” for the general “people’s defense”, by 
the numerous and strong regular police forces supplemented by large reserve 
police forces, and by special security forces, with many undercover agents who 
are provided with the necessary means (financial and other) to act both within 
and outside Serbia. 
Individuals who are part of this enlarged state security system have enjoyed 
various legal and extra-legal benefits such as salaries paid in foreign currencies 
while abroad, in addition to their regular payments in the home country, additional 
payments for being separated from their families, provisions for early retirement, 
and other financial and non-financial benefits. Without further explanation, it may 
be justly claimed that such a state security and defense public policy contributed 
greatly to the comparatively costly state in Yugoslavia, and present-day Serbia.
In relation to these increased costs of state which stem from the political 
visions of “state interests”, one should mention the enormous costs of Serbian 
involvement in the “Yugoslav wars” of the 1990s, politically “justified” by the 
need to defend, “by all disposable means”, Serbian national interests. It is unjust 
to attribute these high costs for the involvement in wars aimed at defending 
“national interests” to the shortcomings of the previous Yugoslav “socialist 
system”. Still, present citizens of Serbia should be considered at least in part 
responsible for the costs of the involvement of Serbia in the “Yugoslav wars” 
due to the legitimacy they provided for state policies and the politicians who 
designed and implemented these “war policies”. 
46  There are no official data about the numbers of individuals in the former Yugoslav Army, but it was 
often claimed that it was one of the most populous armies in Europe.
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There are also other public policies which were implemented during the past 
decades in Yugoslavia and Serbia that have had long-term detrimental economic 
impacts and other consequences. These should not be overlooked when 
answering the following question: Why is Serbia currently facing collapse and 
long-lasting social crisis? Again, in the articulation and implementation of these 
public policies, politicians, not ordinary citizens, played the crucial role. 
It is evident that both the former Yugoslavia and current Serbia are small states in 
terms of world relations. Still, the ambitions of the leaders of these small states have 
been great, with the expectation that they could considerably influence international 
relations. One could assume that this perception of the state’s “greatness”, partly 
supported by the preconditioned beliefs of “ordinary” citizens, contributed to the 
establishment of the highly developed diplomatic missions of Yugoslavia and 
present-day Serbia in almost every country in the world. The financing of these 
numerous missions abroad must have been a great burden on the state budget. To 
this one must add the expenses of the extra-diplomatic activities of state organs 
and business associations, and of financial support for international associations 
and organizations in which Yugoslavia has been a founder and/or member (such as 
the institutions and conferences of the “non-alignment movement”). The financial 
implications of the state policies of making a small country an influential country 
in world developments must have been as burdensome on the state budget as 
budgetary transfers to collapsing “political factories”.
Particular attention should be paid to the policies for supporting the maintenance 
of peaceful and good interethnic relations in the former multiethnic Yugoslavia 
and, to some degree, in present-day Serbia. One of the consequences of these 
policies was the building of some important businesses (factories and likewise) 
in each of the constituent parts of Yugoslavia, in every region, even every local 
community.  Such often underutilized business capacity became economically 
inefficient, but this inefficiency was often attributed to the “self-managed” mode 
of functioning.
In an attempt to “build a socialist society” (a society different to capitalist 
societies); a society not divided by conflicting interests; a society of long-lasting 
“social peace”, politicians in former Yugoslavia articulated public policies aimed 
at supporting “peaceful” social situations in the country. In the years 1970-
1980 when political elites could not ignore the evidently increasing inequality 
in the standard of living between those elites and the majority of ordinary 
citizens47, to prevent potentially unavoidable protests by the masses state banks 
were specifically given tasks such as providing loans with low fixed interest rates 
47  President Tito made a very direct critique of the tendency towards increases in the differences in 
the living standards of the political elite and the working people in a speech in Split, 1971.
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to individuals with low monthly incomes. Because of this, a great numbers of 
ordinary citizens could buy cars and new “durable goods” for their homes, and 
could even start to build weekend homes outside cities.
 The state had to provide significant funding to increase the production of this 
“status consumption” by the masses of ordinary citizens. As these investments 
could not be provided for by increasing sources of domestic investment, it was 
necessary to take credit from international agencies, using their terms, with 
interest rates denominated in foreign currencies which disaccorded with the 
fixed dinar interest rates that banks were charging their debtors. This imbalance 
between the state’s obligations toward foreign creditors and the payments of 
internal debtors resulted in the inflationary financing of the state’s internal and 
external obligations. By nominally increasing personal incomes and fixing the 
nominal annuity paid in dinars to internal creditors by citizens, the feeling of a 
real improvement in the standard of living of great number of ordinary workers 
was created, which also led to a feeling that inequality in society was decreasing. 
The long-term effect of such a “policy of equalization in the standard of living” 
in society, the maintenance of a high level of consumption of the political elite 
and the creation of “social peace” due to the virtual improvements in the living 
standards of the masses must have contributed to the increase in state foreign 
debt, unbalanced state budget, decreased the overall efficiency of the economy, 
and deepened overall social crisis48. The 1970-1980s in Yugoslavia were years in 
which there was a rapid increase in debt to foreign states, accelerated inflation, a 
lack of employment opportunities for new generations, increased social tension 
and a lessening of the legitimacy of the existing political system and the forces 
leading that system. 
Even if these assessments of the economic consequences of previous public 
policies in former Yugoslavia, still broadly practiced in current Serbia, are 
undisputable, the actual power-holders in Serbia are “sweeping under the carpet” 
all the findings about the socio-political causes of the long-lasting socio-
economic crisis in this country and slandering citizens, especially those who 
work, by claiming that that Serbia came near to collapse because many of those in 
the “working class” were not doing their jobs properly, and were paid more than 
they earned and deserved. The “new painful reforms”, which primarily involve 
reducing the payments of those working in the public sector and reducing the 
pensions of those receiving pensions from public funds, “should” be considered 
the most efficient and proper response to the long-lasting crisis in Serbia.
For the majority of citizens in Serbia, the “working people” in particular, 
the coming years may be quite gloomy. According to the main efforts of the 
48 A detailed analysis of this policy was provided in Bolcic (1989:166-169).
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present government in the “healing” of the Serbian economy and society, a 
“better future” may eventually come if foreign investors take advantage of the 
promising “new environment” for profitable business in Serbia. During the past 
two years of these “new reforms” the inflow of foreign investment into Serbia has 
been less than expected, in spite of the abundant financial subventions provided 
from government funds to foreign investors and other incentives for starting new 
businesses in Serbia. Among the reasons for this behavior of foreign investors one 
may note the still-widespread socio-political instability in Serbia, primarily due 
to the unresolved “Kosovo situation”, but also of the relatively lean profits which 
may be extracted from investments in Serbia. The internal market in Serbia, due 
to the decrease in the consumption power of the Serbian population (which has 
further decreased due to recent austerity measures) is also discouraging foreign 
investors from starting businesses in Serbia. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Is there a less gloomy future for Serbian citizens in the years to come in terms 
of a resolution to this long-lasting crisis, and under the given internal and external 
conditions in a world that is faced with problems which are not easy to solve? The 
answer is positive, under the assumption that both power-holders and “ordinary 
citizens”, with the necessary sincerity, consider the essential causes of the long-
lasting socio-economic crisis, and reassess inappropriate public policies (both 
those from the “years of socialism” and those from the “years of post-socialism”), 
including the “new radical reforms” advocated by the present government in Serbia.
To prevent possible “state collapse” austerity measures may not be considered 
sufficient. There is an urgent need for comprehensive action by all social actors to 
revitalize and increase the production of “marketable values”49. This production 
of real values will increase the incomes of most citizens and, therefore, increase 
the budgetary means of the state. 
The crucial prerequisite for such an increase in the production of marketable 
values will be the appropriate social arrangements for activating and efficiently 
using all disposable resources (material and human, those “small” and “big”, 
local, national and international). 
To secure such an efficient social arrangement it is of utmost importance 
to establish regulated ownership conditions, a clearly defined legal status 
49  A more detailed description of the measures which can lead to the reconstitution of present-day 
Serbian society is given in S. Bolcic (2013:275-290)
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for all means of production50, clear procedures for transferring ownership 
rights, and legal regulation for other features of ownership relations between 
various social actors. It is important to underline that the regulation of 
ownership relations is a specific “transitional” problem in Serbia due 
to previously largely “dismantled” ownership regulation during decades 
of socialism and self-management, characterized by the peculiar mode of 
“social ownership”. The prevailing concept of the privatization of former 
“state” property applied in other former “socialist countries” did not lead to 
the same real transformative changes in Serbia (and other former republics 
of Yugoslavia) as in these countries. Unfortunately, the peculiarity of the 
largely “dismantled” ownership relations in former Yugoslavia (and Serbia) 
has not been recognized by external and domestic “advisers” concerning the 
“transition” in Serbia51. 
Since the 1990s several state acts have been passed to regulate the “ownership 
transformations” of former “self-managed organizations” and of ownership 
transformations of legally defined “public enterprises”, also including some 
enterprises considered state property. These state acts were incomplete from 
the point of view of securing a comprehensive rearrangement of ownership 
relations. The consequences of this incomplete rearrangement of ownership 
in Serbia are numerous: the unfinished privatization of former “self-managed” 
and “socially owned” firms; difficulties with the privatization of “public” and 
“state” firms; the frequent unsuccessful reactivation of nominally privatized 
firms; the undefined ownership status of numerous assets (land, objects, 
equipment, accounts, etc.); and the accentuated role of state institutions 
(primarily executive organs) in the ownership transformation of individual 
enterprises, and also in creating the conditions (management, finances) for 
the functioning of enterprises which have been for years in the unregulated 
“process” of ownership transformation. It is unquestionable that many of the 
aforementioned problems might have been avoided or more efficiently resolved 
if there had been, on the eve of the post-socialist transformation, a well-
designed and comprehensive ownership law. This state act is still lacking in 
present-day Serbia. The prolonged duration of the destructive socio-economic 
crisis in Serbia is caused by many factors, greatly unregulated ownership 
relations is one of the most relevant. 
50  Many methods of doing this are used by public firms for which there is no clear ownership struc-
ture. 
51  A detailed presentation of the peculiarities of ownership relations in the former Yugoslavia and of 
the consequences of these ownership arrangements for the arduous transition in Serbia is given 
in S. Bolcic (2013:96-111). 
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The final message of this paper to those studying the tendencies of the socio-
economic distress of the societies which have been described is to pay greater 
attention to the real social role of different social actors, especially those who 
play a crucial role in designing specific public policies.   
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